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2Introduction
The last few years have seen a dramatic growth 
of interest in international cultural relations 
and cultural diplomacy in Brussels1. There are 
perhaps five key milestones in this process to 
date: (i) the publication in 2014 of the Prepar-
atory Action Report on Culture in EU External 
Relations, Engaging the World: Towards Global 
Cultural Citizenship (EU, 2014); (ii) the delivery 
in June 2016 by HR Federica Mogherini of the 
Joint Communication, Towards a Strategy for 
International Cultural Relations (EU, 2016a); 
(iii) the inclusion of cultural diplomacy as an in-
strument of policy in the 2016 Global Strategy 
(EU, 2016b); (iv) the adoption by the EU Council 
in May 2017 of conclusions on an EU strategy 
for international cultural relations; and (v) the 
establishment of a Friends of the Presidency 
Group to steer the development of policy in this 
area (Council of the European Union, 2016).
The preference in the cultural policy commu-
nity in Brussels is for the term ‘International 
Cultural Relations’ (hereafter ICR). Not all those 
engaged in international cultural relations see 
themselves engaged in cultural diplomacy 
(hereafter CD) aimed at the enhancement of 
national prestige, standing and influence of the 
EU and its member states in the wider interna-
tional arena. But in the policy domain, it is clear 
from a reading of the 2016 Global Strategy that 
the enhancement of ICR is part of a wider EU 
vision for a better external policy. So, for this 
paper, ICR and CD are seen as two ends of a 
spectrum driven by the same dynamic—the en-
hancement of EU global engagement and, by 
extension, EU influence.
1 Brussels means the European Commission, the External Action Service and the European Parliament.
2 Let me be quite specific concerning my own position. I am a liberal internationalist (a cosmopolitan in the pejorative lan-
guage of the current populist era!). I am an advocate of enhanced international cultural relations as a positive contribution to liberal 
internationalism. My aim in producing this paper is to identify the constraints to be overcome in the successful implementation of 
international cultural policy, not to question its virtues.
The Policy Paper identifies some of the key 
opportunities and constraints in the advance-
ment of ICR and CD in the interactive relation-
ship between culture and foreign policy. The 
opportunities in the relationship are perhaps 
better understood and will be identified in only 
cursory fashion. Less well articulated is the na-
ture of the constraints facing European cultural 
foreign policy in the contemporary era2. These 
constraints we might usefully think of as being 
structural, institutional and agential in nature. 
The paper also identifies factors that may en-
hance the resilience of European actors en-
gaged in ICR and CP in the face of constraint. 
Strategies of resilience are increasingly an es-
sential element of ICR and CD.
The underlying, but not always articulated, 
question driving EU activity in this domain asks: 
To what extent can Europe’s history of, accom-
plishments in, and contemporary expertise in 
culture broadly defined, advance the EU’s glob-
al engagement and external relations? In cli-
chéd terms, it asks to what extent can the EU’s 
ICR and CD enhance Europe’s ‘soft power’ (Nye, 
2004)? And specifically, how might Europe be 
successful in its quest for enhanced ICRs in the 
face of a growing populist nationalist zeitgeist 
(hereafter PNZ)?
The judgment offered in this paper is that the 
EU’s new strategy for the enhancement of ICR 
and CD might well be able to mitigate cross-
cultural tensions. But, its success in doing so 
will be determined by the strength of the imple-
mentation processes and practices developed 
over the next few years; especially the degree 
to which both state and non-state action can 
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to the EU external policy-making process. As 
is known, the major institutional puzzle for EU 
external relation is the degree to which it is 
possible for Brussels to develop a joined-up ap-
proach to ICR-CD, or even less ambitiously sim-
ply speak with a coherent voice. Foreign policy 
remains principally a national preserve of mem-
ber states. In cultural foreign relations, primary 
decision-making competence explicitly rests 
with the member states. Brussels has only a 
supplementary, supporting competence. 
1. Opportunities and Constraints
Culture comprises a spectrum of activities rang-
ing from heritage (artifacts and icons) through 
music, theatre and old and new mediums of 
communication to language, ideas, beliefs and 
the support of cross-national research and ed-
ucation in the arts, humanities and social sci-
ences as well as science. Cultural property and 
practices have both material and politico-stra-
tegic value, and all serve as mediums for ICR 
and CD. Cultural activity and organisations long 
ago escaped the boundaries of the state and 
in an optimum-case scenario ICR and CD, along 
with politico-strategic and economic relations, 
form a third pillar of foreign policy. 
Pursued well, ICR and CD can be one of the 
most sustainable and visible instruments of ex-
ternal relations. Cultural (and educational) pro-
grammes tailored to the needs and interests of 
people in partner countries can create a broad 
basis for stable and positive international re-
lations. At the same time, ICR can help build 
trust, support a country’s societal development 
as well as assist business and political players 
to find important and reliable partners. At their 
best, cultural relations can help create stable 
foundations for international relations in the 
dialogue between peoples. ICR and CD can pro-
mote European integration and present Europe 
and its member states as a modern and attrac-
tive location for education, science, research 
and professional development. None of this 
is contested, and it makes sense for the EU to 
strive to be good at ICR and CD in its own right. 
1. a. Structure and Context 
But the practice of ICR and CD by EU mem-
ber states and attempts to develop common 
policy in Brussels do not operate in a vacuum. 
Recent policy developments reflect, in part at 
least, a growing response to the environment of 
existential crisis identified in the Global Strat-
egy (2016b: 9). This crisis is well captured in 
comparison with the 2003 European Commis-
sion Strategy paper, A Secure Europe in a Bet-
ter World and its 2016 counterpart. 2003 was 
a time of optimism. 2016 a time of pessimism, 
characterised minimally by: 
(i)  Growing scepticism and resistance towards 
globalisation and economic openness; 
(ii)  Growing scepticism for the wider European 
project, especially closer integration (Presi-
dent Juncker’s September 2017 SOTEU not-
withstanding); 
(iii) Growing backlash against immigration;
(iv) The rise of what I have described elsewhere 
as the ‘populist-nationalist zeitgeist’ (here-
after PNZ) that has surged over the last few 
years.
Without elaboration in this paper (but for an 
extended discussion see Higgott and Proud, 
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42017), these four factors determine the oper-
ating environment in which those who would 
wish to enhance the EU’s ICRs must operate. 
Actors, both state and non-state alike, can de-
velop strategies of cultural resilience against 
the populist nationalist surge; however such 
strategies cannot evolve in isolation from wider 
socio-political-economic contexts that envelop 
them.
The development of the populist nationalist 
surge of the last few years reflects a political 
environment that is not conducive to ICR and 
CD. ICRs are underwritten by principles of inter-
nationalism and cosmopolitanism. By contrast, 
the current era reflects a time in which populist, 
nationalist and chauvinist approaches towards 
identity in international relations are stronger 
than at any time since the 1930s. The chang-
ing dynamics and sentiments are captured in 
illustration 1 below. Notable in the populist lex-
icon of the current era are the the assertions 
of nationalism over globalism, illiberalism over 
liberalism, propaganda over evidence; national-
ist identity (ranging from chauvinism through 
to outright xenophobia) over wider societal and 
communitarian concern and an appeal to the 
supposed interests of real people over those of 
the cosmopolitan elites (see Miller, 2017).
Illustration 1. Populist Dynamics
Means
(Tone and 
Approach)
Message
(Rhetoric and 
Substance)
Critical 
Distinctions
Destruction v 
Elevation
Control v 
Helplessness
Nationalism v 
Patriotism
Assertion v 
Evidence
Taking Back v 
Giving Away
Societal 
concern v 
Racism
Propaganda v 
Information
Cultural Pres-
ervation v 
Identity Loss
Real people v 
Political Class
Personal 
Abuse v Argu-
ment
Security v 
Uncertainty/
Risk
Movement v 
Party
Connection v 
Disinterest
Self Determina-
tion v Red Tape/
Bureaucracy
Common 
Sense v Intel-
lectual Argu-
ments
Paranoia v 
Reassurance
Straight Talk v 
Political Obfus-
cation
Internal v 
External Focus
These populist dynamics, it should be said, are 
not formal constraints on the pursuit of ICR as 
much as they are the environmental context in 
which policy and practice must now operate. 
The problem they pose for the enhancement 
of international cultural relations is how demo-
cratic states counter inward looking national-
ist agendas of the populist movements that 
conflict directly with the outward looking ori-
entation of the exponents of cultural dialogues 
(both public and private) in the wider foreign 
policies of many, although not all, of the EU’s 
member states, and indeed of the EU as a for-
eign policy actor in its own right.
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between Culture and Foreign Policy
Conceptual issues are not simply a matter for 
the scholar. Confusion of what we mean by cul-
ture in ICR and CD casts massive shadows over 
policy effectiveness. While we might see and 
know more about the cultures of others now 
than in the past, it does not follow that we are 
better at understanding them, or that it leads 
to mutual respect and engagement. Traditional 
definitions of ICR and CD fail to distinguish be-
tween cultural values and norms.
In brief, here culture, from its German origins mean-
ing ‘self-realisation’, reflects a society’s historically 
determined, moral, religious and national beliefs. 
Culture is often seen as synonymous with a so-
ciety’s values. Norms, while culturally determined, 
are different. More precisely norms describe the 
prescriptive manner in which societal actors be-
have rather than what they believe. International 
cultural dialogues are usually about the norms of 
interaction between cultures, not cultural values 
per se. Discussions over norms are usually adap-
tive where discussions over culture are not (see 
Crowe, 2011: 6-11). 
It is the evolving nature of norms that makes ICR 
and CD a difficult and unpredictable instrument 
in the pursuit of foreign policy and international 
relations; especially if trying to use ICR-CD as 
a vehicle for a more joined-up European policy 
in the face of populist nationalist challenges. 
As the European project has evolved in the post 
World War II era, we have tended to assume a 
set of shared substantive values at the heart 
of ‘Western’ culture—including inter alia com-
mitments to a market economy, some variant 
of liberal democratic governance, a free press, 
religious tolerance and other human rights and 
a belief in the teleological assumptions of the 
European integration project—that we would 
wish for others in a cultural dialogue with us to 
appreciate, receive and eventually accept. 
The pace of change in the modes of communica-
tion, especially the rise of the new social media 
has placed considerable pressure on the norma-
tive modes of transfer of these values, which 
have become less controllable overtime. The EU 
Preparatory Action on the role of culture in the 
EU’s external relations (EU, 2014: 8) stressed the 
growing salience of mutual learning and shar-
ing in what it calls ‘global cultural citizenship’. 
It recognised the increasing role of civil society 
and private sector actors, notably philanthropic 
organisations, corporate sponsors, higher edu-
cation providers (public and private) and cultural 
relations organisations with their ‘huge potential 
for enhancing European influence and attraction’ 
(EU, 2014: 9). Culture, it said, had entered the 
heart of international relations thinking as a ma-
jor public policy issue’ (EU, 2014: 18). 
While an empirically-rich report, the Preparatory 
Action lacked an appreciation of the emerging 
and critical environment of the current era cap-
tured in by PNZ. Moreover, it also had an essen-
tially static view of culture. Yet culture responds 
to each new generation’s aesthetics and tastes, 
changes in the economic and socio political 
context and technological disruption, especially 
the digital technology and the new social media. 
It understood how the revolution in communica-
tions created new possibilities for beneficial en-
gagement within and between societies which 
have all but removed barriers to participation 
and exponentially extended the range of actors 
(official and otherwise) in international cultural 
relation. But it failed to grasp (as indeed many 
of us did) this revolution’s ability to also create 
disruptive socio-politically behaviour of the kind 
seen in recent US and European elections (see 
Sunstein, 2017) and attendant negative implica-
tions for ICR and CD.
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We invariably disagree about the norms, as 
practices, that will ensure delivery of cultures. 
These values and practices per se should not 
be assumed to amount to a common ‘European 
cultural persona that can easily transcends na-
tional boundaries. That there may be a core of 
support for some generic values in Europe is not 
the same as universal support for them. 
Arguing that European values are not amenable 
to universalisation is not to advocate an alterna-
tive strategy under-written by cultural relativism. 
How to sustain (or re-instate) cultural dialogues 
and proved space for diversity of expression 
both internal to and external to the EU, but with-
out lapsing into cultural relativism, are intensely 
practical policy issues for our time. The rise of 
the PNZ has brought this fact home. The PNZ 
directly challenges many of the assumptions 
underpinning the universalising assumptions of 
the EU’s new strategy for international cultural 
relations. 
The 2016 Joint Communication and its subse-
quent adoption by the European Council as the 
EU's strategic approach to international cultural 
relations (EU 2016b) quite specifically identify 
international cultural relations as a significant 
element in the EU’s wider foreign policy. The 
strategy, and by extension the role of its de facto 
agents ambiguously placed between state and 
society such as More Europe (More Europe), 
the Cultural Diplomacy Platform (CDP), and the 
European Union National Institutes for Culture 
(EUNIC) pose questions for us. All appear to re-
sist the idea that they are formally engaged in 
cultural diplomacy as opposed to international 
cultural relations. But this distinction is not as 
clean-cut as the funded organisations would 
like to affirm. As soon as funding comes from 
a state or EU source, the notion of autonomous 
intercultural relations has to cede ground to a 
murkier relationship suggesting a role, in part 
at least, as an instrument of diplomacy. This is 
certainly the way in which those external part-
ners as anticipated recipients of EU ICR and CD 
would see it.
This paper does not challenge the policy ap-
proach adopted by the Council in May 2017— to 
act as a cross-cutting platform to draw up an 
integrated, comprehensive and step-by-step EU 
strategic approach to international cultural rela-
tions … [and to] … identify the common strate-
gic principles, objectives and priorities (Council 
of the European Council, 2016). But there must 
be a question mark over the EU’s ability to suc-
cessfully implement it. Even if differences in 
national cultures could be smoothed over by 
Brussels, there remains a coordination problem 
in which the interests of the main agents, the 
Commission, the EEAS and the member states, 
do not always coincide and will remain difficult 
to manage for as long as cultural relations are 
principally a member state competence. Indeed, 
as even the Global Strategy Statement notes: 
“Putting our diverse national cultures at the ser-
vice of our shared interests is a challenge.” And 
perhaps most tellingly, the strategy does not 
allocate any funds additional to those already 
available through existing Commission and Par-
liamentary instruments that appear to have sim-
ply been repackaged. 
While not explicit, it is clear from reading the 
Joint Communication (2016a) and Global Strat-
egy Statement (2016b) that cultural relations 
both within and beyond the borders of the EU 
are also meant to be important in the mitigation 
of the inward-looking nationalist influences of 
Europe’s populist movements. The Global Strat-
egy Statement talks about societal ‘resilience’ 
and the role of culture in securing it. But it does 
so in a ‘catch all’ non-specific and non-policy 
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ture “societal resilience also by deepening work 
on education, culture and youth to foster plural-
ism, coexistence and respect”.
An alternative reading of the strategy, and the one 
most likely to be received beyond the borders of 
the EU, is that its real aim is to promote EU culture 
and values vis-à-vis the influences of those other 
great players in the contemporary global search 
for influence: the USA and China. While there is 
nothing inherently wrong with such a strategy, 
there is a risk that promotion of a common Euro-
pean culture may become political inflammatory 
if seen as a counter-weight populist-nationalist 
causes. The EU needs to tread very softly both 
within the EU and with third countries if it is not 
to fuel the PNZ resistance internally within the EU 
or generate a backlash externally towards cultural 
diplomacy with extra-European powers.
Indeed, the success of culture diplomacy must 
be measured through the eyes of the target audi-
ence. Influence and reciprocal knowledge shar-
ing in cultural diplomacy is not assured. Cultural 
diplomacy is in constant need of re-mapping and 
checking with recipients. Re-mapping implies not 
only understanding what we mean by culture, but 
also the language and other mediums we use 
to promote it. Without re-mapping old legacies 
of resentment will remain and new resentments 
will develop. This is a particularly important issue 
for the EU in the current age. The EU is indeed a 
global actor, but it is currently beset by crises of 
confidence and identity that engulf it at a time of 
diminished global expectation compared with just 
a decade ago. But European cultural diplomacy is 
destined to fail if its message to the peoples and 
states on either side of the borders of the EU is 
that failure to adopt European values will impede 
the smooth functioning of international society in 
the modern era. Most states, and especially the 
major powers, would not accept this assumption.
The relationship between culture and foreign 
policy, and the cross-national influence of ideas, 
are both a conceptual problem and an empirical 
question, the separation of which is not easy. 
The long held cosmopolitan belief that the de-
velopment of international cultural relations is 
inherently beneficial in foreign policy, and a good 
thing in its own right and not without value, can 
be too easily assumed. The strategy and tactics 
of populist nationalist actors in contemporary 
international relations tests that argument to 
its limits. The Brussels policy community is try-
ing very hard to develop a strategy for cultural 
foreign policy that mitigates the worst excesses 
of nationalism, at the very time that illiberal na-
tionalist sentiments have insinuated themselves 
into the body politic of many individual member 
states. Brussels’ view of Europe’s role as an in-
ternational actor stands in sharp contrast to the 
positions adopted by the continent’s principle 
nationalist populist movements and parties. 
Populists invite real people to substitute experi-
ence for expertise with social media as a vehi-
cle for sharing experiences and bonding. At the 
heart of the PNZ is a view that identity is local 
and national, not European. For the populist, 
culture must be defended against the diluting 
power of Brussels and the wider global and cos-
mopolitan liberal elite. Claims of a shared Euro-
pean culture, primarily by virtue of geography, 
are problematic. Building a shared culture is in-
evitably an iterative process. It is not likely to be 
much aided by top-down pro-EU cultural activi-
ties that fail to address the current nationalist 
populist angst.
At this precise moment, the populists concern 
is less a creeping EU culture, but what they de-
scribe as the immediate national cultural crisis 
threatened by out of control mass immigration 
facilitated by EU principles and incited by the 
actions of Merkel’s government. The tangible 
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linked to factors such as challenges to lan-
guage, religion and customs are very real and 
indeed a legitimate issue of public policy. It is 
something that nationalist populist actors do 
not see as a policy problem but as an existential 
challenge to the identity and sovereignty of the 
nation state. 
Is this reading too bleak? Perhaps. While there 
may be no ‘European persona’, there is a sense 
of European ‘actorness’ in many key policy are-
as. The Global Strategy identifies a set of shared 
operating principles—acting as a responsible 
global stakeholder promoting a rules-based 
global order. Captured in the concept of ‘prin-
cipled pragmatism’ the strategy determines the 
priorities for EU action. The key issue is whether 
they can be actioned.
2. What Can Be Done?
In order to undercut populist platforms, it is neces-
sary to both: (i) build robust cultural resilience (and 
confidence) at a national level (see Capano and 
Woo, 2016 and Cross and LaPorte, 2016); and (ii) 
reassure citizens that the EU as a cultural, as well 
as an economic and legislative entity is not a threat 
to national identity. This requires positive support 
for the wider European project that goes to the 
heart of EU strategy in the Global Vision statement. 
Networks of non-state actors are understood to be a 
central feature of the 21st century world (see Slaugh-
ter, 2017). These networks will be important for build-
ing cultural resilience and supporting ICR and CD in 
the face of the PNZ. At the interface of government 
and non-government sectors, there are umbrella or-
ganisations in the European cultural space, notably 
but not exclusively EUNIC that, without formally ar-
ticulating such a position, have an interest in resist-
ing the narrow attitudes of the PNZ towards culture 
and international cultural relations. This offers both 
strength and weakness. It is strength because there 
are a large number of actors involved in at the inter-
face of ICR and CD operating at EU level.
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from the illustration above, it presents obvious 
coordination problems. There are over 300 cul-
tural networks, many located in Brussels, with 
members all over Europe. These groups are 
coming together more than in the past to con-
sider the implications of, and their role in coun-
tering, the PNZ (see for example IETM, 2017 and 
the empirical discussion in Higgott and Proud, 
2017). But it is difficult to measure just how ef-
fective non-partisan grassroots organisations 
are as cultural actors both nationally and trans-
nationally. Arts and cultural communities can 
be positioned to play a role against the PNZ. 
Their models can highlight common values 
across borders and share objectives to combat 
the PNZ. 
At a minimum, they can open minds and give 
people the means to imagine an alternative to 
the populist message; good storytelling can 
help people identify with others, care about their 
journey and issues, and act as an antidote to 
the lack of empathy (pace Donald Trump) that 
underlies many of the extreme views of populist 
leaders. But the risk for movements based on 
broad principles rather than specific outcomes 
is that initial enthusiasm and momentum can 
fade as supporter fatigue sets. Youth is a good 
example. It is actively involved in the pro-EU 
movements. But it is worth noting that its in-
centives may be quite different from the ge-
neric, principled aims of ‘elder statesmen’. For 
the young, support for the EU is much more spe-
cific. The EU passport is seen as more valuable 
than a national one. However, that their support 
for the EU is personal and logistic matters less 
than that it is support per se.
2.a. The Role of Arts and Cultural Industries 
The arts and cultural community is the source of 
much social analysis and critique and as Leer-
son (2017) notes: ‘…while culture will not neces-
sarily solve our problems, a lack of culture will 
definitely exacerbate them.’ Artists remain one 
of the many sources of challenge to the status 
quo. They exhibit a preference for open, argu-
mentative and Socratic discourse. By contrast, 
as we see in many countries, populists tend to 
be uncomfortable with these methods. They 
tend to prefer silence or discrediting the views 
of others.
Much of our discussion about culture and arts 
presumes art presented in traditional form: that 
is “high art” or “high culture”. But when televi-
sion, film, music and social media connect with 
people where they live and play there may be lit-
tle or no time to focus on high culture. In terms 
of reach, this is where successful engagement, 
if it is to happen, is most likely to be found and 
the artistic and cultural influence in a world of 
virtual reality should not be ignored in develop-
ing resilience strategies against the PNZ. But 
how to reach the wider audience will always be 
the key question. The role of art in such contexts 
is noble but problematic. Agenda-driven artistic 
expression is unlikely to mitigate long-standing 
populist opinion and may risk sacrificing quality 
for messaging. At its worst, it can also enhance 
polarisation. 
Perhaps the major task of arts and culture then 
is to resist the normalising of the behaviour of 
populists and nationalists when they are at the 
height of their powers: to continually remind us 
that such behaviour is the deviant not the norm. 
One test of resilience is the degree to which eve-
ryday life goes on in spite of the pressures ema-
nating from authoritarian and illiberal regimes. 
Continuity cannot be assumed. History shows 
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us how musicians, filmmakers, writers and even 
architects were hi-jacked as propaganda tools 
by for example both Hitler and Stalin (Morrison, 
2017).
It is here that art and culture are important. 
They need to stay a subversive idea structure. 
It needs to make sure that the cultural ground 
does not freeze under populism. Culture must 
flow around it. It can reflect the values of that 
community, speak truth about culture, expose 
political and social hypocrisy within a nation, 
improve the quality of life, build social and cul-
tural capital and inject imagination into pro-
cesses of resilience and re-invention. Let us not 
forget that the European anthem, Ode to Joy, 
when written by Beethoven was in fact a stri-
dent cry for universal freedom. If the civic cul-
tural capital of a country can resist and survive 
the damage done by populism, then populism’s 
challenge can be limited in the long run. Art, 
writing, theatre, comedy and the technological 
mediums of cinema, music and social media 
provide vehicles for challenging the popular-
nationalist zeitgeist and both its domestic and 
international political impact. 
It can be argued that after nearly 70 years of a 
liberal world order underwritten to a greater or 
lesser extent by the USA acting as a self-bind-
ing hegemon, we are entering a period when 
transactional, power-based engagement in in-
ternational politics is emerging. We see this at 
its most pronounced in US foreign policy under 
Donald Trump (but also in part in Putin’s Russia 
and Xi Jinping’s China). This is not a world in 
which Europe will fare well. The EU needs what 
we might call a post neo-liberal approach to in-
ternational relations and foreign policy. More 
than any other major global actor, Europe has 
an interest in a rules-based liberal order founded 
on cooperation. Such an order plays to Europe’s 
strengths and offsets, in part at least, its materi-
al and security weaknesses. This is recognised 
in the Global Strategy paper. Supporting this ap-
proach begins within the borders of the EU.
In-country liberal resilience in Europe does 
not mean crushing populism and nationalism. 
Rather, it means responding to it where it can 
and containing it where it must. Let us not for-
get that to be a liberal society means accommo-
dating diversity and not insisting that all groups 
subscribe to liberal values. Such an insistence 
would contradict liberalism’s own commitment 
to individualism and openness. But liberalism 
needs to reassert the virtues of openness if it 
is to mitigate the appeal of modern populism. 
Culture must play its role here.
Art and culture’s role in securing a strong Euro-
pean international narrative in the face of pop-
ulism and nationalism will always be an unlikely 
and ambiguous combination of a theoretical 
abstraction of European collective ideas on the 
one hand—converging around virtues of open-
ness and democracy—and, on the other, a con-
crete historical experience in which embracing 
these ideas in practice requires the shedding at 
tightly defined ideas of identity and national clo-
sure. This is a difficult proposition at this time 
as we live with a conundrum. Europe’s great-
est successes—creating a regime of the free 
exchange of ideas, values and yes, people over 
time—has become its Achille’s heel. Objections 
to the idea of globalism and the practice of 
cross-border migration have become anathema 
in the PNZ. The ideas of the PNZ in the hands 
of populist movements and parties have fuelled 
the critique of the EU as non-transparent, unac-
countable and lacking legitimacy.
Cultural civil society movements might have a 
role in mitigating these critiques. If the EU is to 
ward off the closure of borders and indeed the 
closure of minds, as contemplated by the popu-
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list and nationalist discourse, it must combine 
an organic, bottom up with and a more formal 
top down, directed approach to the development 
of ICR. To give one example, EUNIC while explic-
itly non-political nevertheless sees its role sup-
porting the European project and doing so, in the 
words of the Joint Communication, by building 
trust and understanding between the peoples 
of Europe and the rest of the world through cul-
ture. It is thus implicitly working in opposition 
to the closed approach of international cultural 
relations found among advocates of the PNZ. 
Without a strong network of support, an ex-
pectation that artistic and cultural groups can 
achieve wide reaching impact in countering the 
PNZ is optimistic. Arts funding is a perennial 
and much discussed issue, but how to support 
these groups preferably through existing organ-
isations and networks rather than creating new 
ones, is an essential part of any strategy if they 
are to participate in the broader enhancement 
of the EU project.
The development of a strategic approach to 
cultural relations within the arts and cultural 
communities is an increasingly salient area of 
Europe’s international relations. But the balance 
in the relationship between policy makers, civil 
society organisations and practitioners, given 
the different priorities and motivations of their 
respective endeavours, will always be a delicate 
one. Whilst on the same spectrum, informal cul-
tural interaction and formal cultural diplomacy 
at the ends of that spectrum, can be far apart, 
with ‘cultural relations’ sitting somewhere be-
tween. The Council of the European Union, in its 
adoption of the strategy, gives us an insight into 
the tasks facing its successful implementation. 
It places a high degree of reliance on non-gov-
ernmental actors such as More Europe, the Cul-
tural Diplomacy Platform and EUNIC. This has 
both strengths and weaknesses.
Given its position at the interstices of policy 
and practice, EUNIC is becoming an essential 
interlocutor between the Brussels policy world 
and that of the world of arts and culture. Indeed, 
this is a position that has been recognised in 
the signing of the MOU between the EEAS and 
EUNIC to assist in the administration of Euro-
pean ICR (EU, 2017). If EUNIC did not exist, you 
would want to invent it. It is not yet clear that a 
similar case could be made for the Cultural Di-
plomacy Platform. Longer-standing and proven 
initiatives have been on offer for some time 
from a wide range of extant highly relevant ac-
tors such as the International Network of Con-
temporary Performing Arts (IETM) and the Eu-
ropean Network on Cultural Management and 
Policy (ENCATC) in the civil society sector and 
in the European university sector and think tank 
sectors such as the Universities of Sienna and 
Edinburgh, the Vrije Universiteit Brussels (VUB), 
CERI and Clingendael that all have broad exper-
tise in public diplomacy, including cultural diplo-
macy, but that do not isolate cultural diplomacy 
from wider international and foreign policy con-
texts as seems to be the case with some of the 
Brussels-sponsored institutions. 
3. The Limits of Cultural Diplomacy in EU 
Foreign Policy 
Endeavouring to make the best of Europe’s 
cultural assets is sensible and rational and so 
rightly becomes an instrument of policy. But as-
sumptions that EU can stem its declining influ-
ence vis-a-vis the traditional, if troubled, hegem-
on, the USA, and the rising global force of China 
is pietistic rather than analytic. Even ignoring 
the PNZ, other serious problems exist. 
EU partners, especially in the Middle East and 
many other developing countries, will always 
treat cultural diplomacy with suspicion. The 
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problem is less the substance and virtue of 
western cultural values per se. Rather, the is-
sues are (i) the well-understood residual his-
torical legacies of mistrust (see for example 
Bowden, 2009); and (ii) the modern ‘norms-as-
practices’ that would be necessary for trans-
national/cross-border delivery of EU culture. 
To suggest that there is a common and aspi-
rational European culture available for export, 
as some of the more assertive brands of Euro-
pean normative power do, is at best foolhardy, 
at worst ethnocentrically arrogant. While there 
may be some substance to the Global Strategy 
suggestion that the EU’s joint potential is unpar-
alleled, HR Federica Mogherini’s 2016 assertion 
that Europe was a ‘cultural superpower’ was 
at best misconceived and, at worst, inept (EU-
news, 2016). Self-identification as a ‘superpow-
er’ is not a notion that easily lends itself to the 
improvement of international cultural relations; 
especially with parts of the world with different 
historical experiences of European colonialism, 
different, socio-cultural traditions and on differ-
ent political trajectories.
While the rhetoric of EU international cultural 
relations is strong (at least in Brussels), the 
likelihood of concrete outcomes—especially in 
member states with their own strong traditions 
of cultural diplomacy—should not be overesti-
mated. The Commission has only ‘supporting 
competence’ in cultural diplomacy (Art 6, TFEU). 
A foreign policy coordination problem, reflected 
at times in the tense relationship between the 
member states and the EEAS, is always pre-
sent in Brussels. For some member states, the 
role of the EEAS is still little more than that of a 
policy amplifier. Cultural diplomacy is no excep-
tion. The Joint Communication reflects this am-
biguity, and cultural diplomacy secures only one 
sentence in the Global Strategy Statement as-
serting that new fields of our joined-up external 
action include energy diplomacy, cultural diplo-
macy and economic diplomacy (EU, 2016b: 49). 
Moreover, the superpower analogy fails to re-
flect the reality of the often non joined-up re-
lationship between Brussels and the member 
states. This is the case both informally but also 
formally. This naive given that even the Council 
Conclusions on the Strategy stress the principle 
of subsidiarity and ‘ensuring full complementa-
rity with Member States’ actions’ (Council of the 
European Union, 2017). Deconstructed, this is 
confirmation of the primacy of member states 
in ICR and CD.
This Paper has suggested that there will be 
constraints on the EU’s ability to implement the 
strategy. In addition, even if differences in na-
tional cultures could be smoothed over by Brus-
sels, there remains a coordination problem as 
long as ICR is principally a member state’s com-
petence. Moreover, ‘crowding out’ is an issue in a 
packed, and expensive, external relations agen-
da. CD may be a ‘new field of joined-up external 
action’, but it is to be expected that older, more 
traditional hard power priorities will grow and 
continue to secure the lions’ share of resourc-
es. Security is increasingly a domestic problem 
as much as it is an international. Pressures to 
meet enhanced hard security obligations will 
predominate. As was noted, the strategy does 
not allocate any new funds additional to those 
already available under existing instruments 
and practices in the current funding round. 
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Conclusion
This Policy Paper has probably raised more 
questions than it has answered. It has tried to 
identify both opportunities and constraints on 
the development of a European strategy for in-
ternational cultural relations and cultural diplo-
macy. It has suggested that there are three types 
of constraints—structural (politico-economic 
context), ideational (defining the appropriate 
normative agenda for ICR-CD) and agential (the 
role of people and institutional agents). These 
big picture constraints cast an immediate pol-
icy shadow; namely how do we address three 
practical problems: How do we: (i) overcome 
the competence problem in the policy making 
relationship between the member states and 
Brussels; (ii) how do we resolve the perennial 
coordination problem; (iii) how do we address 
the funding problem?
The caveats placed on the prospect for a suc-
cessful EU strategy for international cultural 
interaction are not arguments for cultural rela-
tivism or a critique of European values per se. 
Rather, while the EU’s stated strategic cultural 
aim is to promote diversity in cultural relations, 
the reading likely taken by recipients on the re-
ceiving end of the strategy beyond the border 
of the EU, is that its real aim is to promote the 
EU’s interests, standing in search for contempo-
rary global search for influence—especially vis-
à-vis the USA and China. Again, there is nothing 
wrong with such a strategy. But the EU needs 
to tread very softly with third countries if it is 
not to generate a backlash. In such a context, it 
will be interesting to observe over the next few 
years the degree to which cultural diplomacy 
can really be, in HR Mogherini’s own words ‘… at 
the core of our foreign policy’.
Recommendations for a more joined-up 
approach to EU cultural diplomacy*
1.  Resist endeavours to secure an agreed Euro-
pean narrative. It does not exist.
2.  Eschew attempts to formally define cultural 
diplomacy. Its meaning will differ across Eu-
rope and beyond. To the extent that a Euro-
pean position exists or develops, support for 
it will always be issue-area or policy sector 
specific not generic.
3. Develop strategies to map and re-map the 
evolving nature of ICR and CD activity. Do so 
by drawing on recent innovation in digital map-
ping to create a tool specific to mapping for EU 
cultural relations and cultural diplomacy. 
4.  Accept that ICR and CD are two ends of a 
spectrum of policy areas in their own right 
rather than discrete entities. Resist seeing 
them simply as second-tier instruments of 
an ill-defined notion of soft power.
5.  Accept the primacy of sovereignty in ICR and 
CD. Collective EU approaches towards cul-
tural diplomacy are constrained by the sover-
eignty of member states for as long as ICR-CD 
has only a secondary Brussels provenance. 
6.  Given 5 above, revisit the issue of the locus 
of core competence. If cultural diplomacy is 
to be a core part of the EU’s Global Strategy, 
then at the very least consideration should 
be given to providing it with the competency 
to play a joined-up role.
7.  Create designated funding. While funding for 
supporting the ICR strategy arising from the 
Joint Communication is available in Brus-
sels, it is dispersed. A designated fund to 
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support the strategy must be secured in the 
next funding round and put at the disposal of 
an appropriate instrument in the EEAS.
8.  Develop a joined-up structure of governance 
for ICR and CD. Recognising the ambiguous 
nature of the relationship between state and 
non-state actors in ICR, the principle stake-
holders need to be identified and the struc-
tures of governance need to be worked out 
in some detail. Specifically: 
a.  The role of the Friends of the Presidency 
Group (on a strategic approach to inter-
national cultural relations) needs to be 
formally and clearly determined after its 
definition of the initial roadmap is com-
pleted.
b.  The role of the EEAS needs to be fully ar-
ticulated and explained for the clarity of 
stakeholders in the arts and cultural com-
munities
c.  Articulate a precise role for the important 
non-state networks and interlocutors such 
as EUNIC in the relationship between the 
policy community and civil society. 
d.  Similarly, consideration should be given 
to the future role of Creative Europe now 
that the new strategy has been adopted.
9.  Revisit training in Cultural Diplomacy. Seri-
ous and systematic thought about the nature 
of training that is offered in cultural diplo-
macy is required, beyond what has amateur-
ishly been the case to date. Instruction can-
not, as many from the cultural sector seem 
to think, be developed and taught in isolation 
of the wider considerations of overall EU ex-
ternal relations and strategy more generally. 
Engage Europe’s universities in this process.
* The recommendations reflect only the author’s 
view, with no responsibility allocated to others.
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